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Abstract:  How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic 
memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting 
effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project.  A purported corrective against this bias was offered as 
a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”.  Also dangerous, however, is 
a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality:  our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive 
capacities to an exaggerated sense of typical human performance.  I dub this error “anthropofabulation”, since it 
combines anthropocentrism with confabulation about our own prowess.  Anthropofabulation has long distorted the 
debate about animal minds, but it is a bias that has been little discussed and against which the Canon provides no 
protection.  Luckily, there is a venerable corrective against anthropofabulation:  a principle offered long ago by 
David Hume, which I call “Hume’s Dictum”.  In this paper, I argue that Hume’s Dictum deserves a privileged place 
next to Morgan’s Canon in the methodology of comparative psychology, illustrating my point through a discussion 
of the debate over Theory of Mind in nonhuman animals. 
I. Introduction 
C. Lloyd Morgan, one of the founders of comparative psychology, worried that his new science would be 
vulnerable to anthropomorphic bias, here taken as the tendency to attribute human characteristics to non-human 
entities on the basis of insufficient or superficial evidence.  To mitigate this bias, he recommended a corrective, 
which has come to be known as “Morgan’s Canon”.  The Canon states that “in no case may we interpret an action as 
the outcome of the exercise of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes 
which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (Morgan, 1903).  Since its publication, 
nearly every aspect of the Canon has been the subject of misinterpretation (Radick, 2000; Thomas, 2006), but its 
proper interpretation and justification need not concern us here (for that see Sober, 1998, 2005).  The important 
point for present purposes is that the Canon—or, at least, a suitable replacement principle, should we decide that the 
Canon has been so misapplied as to be beyond salvage (Fitzpatrick, 2008)—provides useful guidance in countering 
anthropomorphic bias with careful experimental design.  In particular, it has reminded comparative cognition 
researchers to rule out alternative explanations of data—especially reflexes, innate-releasing mechanisms, and basic 
forms of classical and operant conditioning—by performing adequate controls and devising problems or tasks that 
could not be solved by these ubiquitous contrast classes.  Where this methodology succeeds, one avoids 
anthropomorphic bias by eschewing the use of our folk interpretive tendencies to decide whether a “higher” 
explanation of some data is legitimate.  So long as experiments have been properly designed to arbitrate between 
competing hypotheses, as Sober (2005, 97) puts it, “the only prophylactic we need is empiricism.”1 
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 In practice, many comparative psychologists read the Canon in a stronger way, as recommending the default 
position that animal behavior is driven by lower processes unless evidence can be provided that only explanation in 
terms of higher processes is adequate.  On the weaker reading adopted throughout this article, we should instead 
There is, however, another serious problem plaguing comparative research against which Morgan’s Canon 
provides no protection.  The issue is that the psychological abilities of animals largely fall somewhere in-between 
the “lowest” forms of reflexes and associative learning and the “highest” forms of cognition, and we currently 
possess only the rudiments of a psychological taxonomy adequate to characterize the range of similarities and 
differences.  As such, comparative psychologists have set off to investigate whether animals possess capacities such 
as Theory of Mind (ToM), episodic memory, and metacognition, before knowing precisely what types or degrees of 
similarity would be relevant.  These concepts are not even done baking in human psychology, and so deciding how 
to apply them to animals is especially fraught (Emery & Clayton, 2009; Shettleworth, 2009).  Since a decision on 
what these terms should mean is a decision about what abilities comparative psychologists should investigate, steps 
here should be taken carefully. 
In approaching these challenges, the debate over whether animals have a ToM serves as an excellent case 
study, for three decades of empirical research into the question have inspired vigorous debate but little consensus.  
Proponents of animal ToM argue that recent findings provide evidence that some animals can represent the 
perceptual states of conspecifics (Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Bugnyar, 2007; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Emery & 
Clayton, 2009), while others—most notably Penn & Povinelli (2007), but also more recently Lurz (2009, 2011)—
are more skeptical.  They argue that these results can more parsimoniously be explained in terms of “behavior-
reading” capacities—that is, capacities sensitive only to contingencies between observable cues (such as gaze 
direction and body orientation) and their behavioral outcomes.  A puzzling feature of this debate (as well as similar 
comparative debates over other capacities such as episodic memory and metacognition) is that the controversy has 
only deepened as experimental results have accumulated.   
 This failure to converge on consensus suggests deeper disagreements over methodology, evidence, and 
interpretation.  Indeed, several methodological and epistemic components of this dispute have been well-explored by 
philosophers and psychologists, including:  the dangers of anthropomorphic bias in the interpretation of 
experimental results (Keeley, 2004; Wynne, 2007), the issue of which hypotheses are more parsimonious 
(Fitzpatrick, 2009; Heyes, 1998), the falsifiability of behavior-reading or ToM-based hypotheses (Fletcher & 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
remain agnostic about results that could be explained by either higher or lower causes.  I do not here explore the 
question as to which interpretation was intended by Morgan (for that see Richards (1989) and Radick (2000), who 
reach somewhat different conclusions). 
Carruthers, 2012), the ecological validity of experiments (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003), 
and whether experimenters are even performing the right kind of task to elicit ToM (Andrews, 2012; Andrews, 
2005).  In each case, promising methodological correctives have been suggested, though at present the controversy 
endures.   
By contrast, the semantic dimensions of these debates have largely been neglected.  This is unfortunate, for 
whether animals possess ToM, episodic memory, or metacognition surely depends upon what we mean by ‘ToM’, 
‘episodic memory’, and ‘metacognition’.  However, we simply do not yet know precisely what these terms of art 
mean; they are vague in the sense that they have a large space of borderline cases for which there is no consensus as 
to whether they apply.
2
  Moreover, a quick literature scan suggests that ‘ToM’ has been interpreted in significantly 
different ways by proponents and skeptics, and as a result applied to the same data in different ways. For example, 
both sides of the dispute over ToM agree that chimpanzees have demonstrated some success in responding 
appropriately to the perceptual states of conspecifics in competitive situations but have largely failed to respond 
appropriately in cooperative situations.  Proponents tend to favor graded notions of ‘ToM’ according to which 
success in competitive contexts alone could be sufficient; Bugnyar (2007, 15) suggests that “’full-blown’ ToM does 
not represent one single mechanism but is composed of a set of skills”, Call & Tomasello (2008) recommend a 
“broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’” in which chimpanzees might display ToM in ecologically-valid 
contexts but not in others, and Santos, Flombaum, & Phillips (2007, 445) write that their subjects’ ability to “[finely-
tune] to exactly the variables, postures, and behaviors in their environment that are relevant to problems of social 
reasoning [in competitive situations alone]…in essence boils down to a ToM system.”3  Against these more 
permissive interpretations, skeptics such as Penn & Povinelli (Penn & Povinelli 2012, 16) assert that “the essence of 
                                                          
2
 This vagueness could be either epistemic or metaphysical.  If the disputed terms are natural kind terms, for 
instance, then they may really have sharp boundaries, and borderline cases are a temporary product of our ignorance 
of these kinds’ underlying natures.  Alternatively, if defining a term requires ineliminable appeal to evaluatives—
like “reliable” or “intelligent”—then vagueness may be a permanent feature of its associated concept. 
3
 Listing these proponents together is not meant to suggest that there are not subtle differences amongst their 
positions—only that they share a common thread, denied by Povinelli and colleagues, that existing data from 
experiments on competitive situations alone provides good evidence that some non-human primates have a 
perceptual ToM.  
[a] ToM …is the ability to explicitly represent (i.e., predicate) and reason about the causal role played by a given 
mental state across disparate behavioral contexts” (my emphasis), and thus that none of these context-bound 
analogues or precursors are worthy of the name.  
The skeptical claim that these islands of social understanding do not count as ToM is not at bottom 
empirical, but rather semantic.  And worse, psychologists have no established methods to responsibly evaluate this 
kind of semantic question.  As a result, once a skeptic stomps around claiming that some pinnacle of human 
cognitive achievement is essential to a psychological capacity, the comparative waters around that capacity are 
muddied for everyone.  Of course, this is not to suggest that the debate is merely semantic—as though the issue 
could be settled by conceptual analysis.  As we will see, the semantic question is closely intertwined with the other 
methodological issues mentioned above, and attempts to precisify the disputed terms must be evaluated at least in 
part by their empirical adequacy—by how well precisifications can support fruitful empirical inquiries.  Neither, 
however, can these debates be resolved solely by conducting more or better experiments, without also reaching 
consensus on what ought to count as “genuine” ToM, episodic memory, and metacognition. 
Despair might set in with the realization that different research groups are talking past one another in these 
debates, prompting some broad points of consensus.  Both sides should move away from pass/fail tests and 
sweeping claims, rely more on predictions generated from precise computational models of capacities rather than 
informal intuitions, and be more concerned with what each species can do across a range of problems and contexts 
rather than whether they perform as well as humans on a few artificial tasks (Shettleworth, 2009).  Perhaps that 
ought to be the end of the discussion; but to retreat from difficult semantic questions entirely is to simply give up on 
comparative psychology, replacing it with human psychology, chimpanzee psychology, raven psychology, and so 
on.  This would come with costs; we would never know which capacities animals share with us (and each other), 
and how alike are the roles they play in our and their lives.  So—and here comes a big conditional claim—if we find 
these comparative questions interesting enough to merit empirical investigation, then we ought to dig in our heels 
somewhere and develop ground rules for drawing those lines in a responsible and useful way. 
In this paper, I propose codifying one such principle, which I dub “Hume’s Dictum” after its author, the 
philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).  Analogues of Hume’s Dictum have occasionally popped up in these debates, 
but it has not yet been formally recognized as a principle of equal importance with other well-known principles such 
as Morgan’s Canon.  As a result, researchers who would otherwise endorse the Dictum have sometimes subtly 
violated it.  While I do not propose that the Dictum can settle all unclarity surrounding ‘ToM’ or the other capacities 
mentioned above, it does provide some much-needed semantic guidance in what is otherwise a methodological void.   
In Section II, I discuss a type of semantic bias that I call “anthropofabulation”, placing it with respect to 
two other comparative biases (anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism) and reviewing the disadvantages of 
succumbing to the bias.  In Section III, I introduce Hume’s Dictum and explain how it can help us avoid 
anthropofabulation, working in conjunction with other principles such as Morgan’s Canon to point towards a more 
fruitful direction for future comparative research.   
II.  Anthropocentrism and Anthropofabulation 
 To explore our primary case study, let us return to the notion of mental state representation that skeptics 
suppose essential for genuine ToM.  The relevant sort of representation has proven difficult to characterize, but the 
idea is derived from the original suggestion of Premack and Woodruff (1978) that ToM essentially involves the 
attribution of mental states that are not directly observable.  Penn & Povinelli (2007) attempt to make this notion 
precise by offering a semi-formal notation in which the critical feature of ToM is the ability to represent information 
about another’s mental states, with such higher-order representations denoted in their formalism as ‘ms’ states.  
While they decline to provide a general theory of when one state represents information about another (though 
gesturing at Dretske, 1988), they propose a “stopgap” answer that an ms candidate does so if and only if “the state of 
the ms variable co-varies with the state of the other cognitive state in a generally reliable manner” (Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007, 733).  Barring telepathy, however, animals lack direct perceptual access to the cognitive states of 
other organisms, and so the best they could do is derive another’s mental state indirectly from perceivable evidence 
by way of a mediating theory.  Animals, skeptics claim, have shown no ability to represent mental states in this 
way—because previous evidence can be better explained in terms of an (admittedly cognitive and sophisticated) 
ability to group perceptual situations into abstract classes such as threat-posture, eye- or face-direction, body-
position, and direct-line-of-gaze.   
 A concern with this ‘ms’-notation is that its semantics reproduces the vagueness of the original concept of 
ToM that it was meant to clarify.  In particular, by declining to confront the philosophical question of when one state 
represents another, Penn & Povinelli do not specify how reliably or across how many different contexts a 
representational state must covary with an unobservable mental state to count as representing it.
4
  Clearly, we cannot 
require perfect covariation; philosophical consensus holds that the possibility of misrepresentation is a necessary 
condition for representation (Dretske, 1986).  Furthermore, signal detection theory illustrates that the correlation 
between the state of a representation and the state of its referent could be reliable enough for adaptive purposes at 
low levels of covariation if the tradeoff between hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections worked out in the 
right way (Macmillan, 2002, and see Table 1).  For example, if missing signs of anger in a dominant can result in a 
subordinate’s death, it will pay off for it to recruit a low-reliability anger-indicator to control fleeing movements, 
given that the imbalance between the costs of unnecessarily running away vs. death is large.  Doing so might not 
reflect a deficiency of representational power in the animal in question, but rather a rational allocation of epistemic 
resources.   
 anger present anger absent 
candidate ms active Hit False Alarm 
candidate ms inactive Miss Correct Rejection 
 
Figure 1.  Possible outcomes in Signal Detection Theory between a candidate ms representation and the mental state 
of another organism, anger. 
 
The important point for present purposes is that if perfect reliability is not in the cards, we must decide how 
reliably and across what range of contexts one mental state must track the mental state of another to count as 
representing it.  Humans also represent the mental states of conspecifics imperfectly, but Povinelli and other skeptics 
are always satisfied that at least the upper range of human-level performance is sufficient for ToM.  In short, the 
skeptical arguments of Povinelli and colleagues all depend upon the assumption that ToM allows agents to track the 
mental states of others to a degree ostensively illustrated by a few experiments (many of which have never been 
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 As degree of representational reliability is a robust source of vagueness, it is likely that the treatment of this section 
could be extended to debates over the possession by animals of other capacities characterized in terms of 
representational contents—including at least metacognition (similarly described as the ability to represent one’s own 
mental states) and episodic memory (often characterized in terms of the “what-when-where” information recorded in 
an episodic memory). 
performed) that at least human children by a certain age are expected to pass (around 5 years of age is offered as the 
likely threshold), and other animals to fail (Povinelli & Vonk 2003; Penn & Povinelli 2007).  
 This emphasis on a distinctively human degree of representational reliability as criterial of ToM reflects an 
additional bias that has been called “anthropocentrism” (Emery & Clayton, 2009).  Anthropocentric bias has 
received less theoretical attention than anthropomorphic bias, and as a result is less well-understood.  Povinelli, who 
himself inveighs against the bias (Povinelli, 2004, 29), describes it as “[holding] the human mind [to be] the gold 
standard against which other minds must be judged.”  So stated, it is hard to see how he is not himself guilty of 
committing it (though see Povinelli & Vonk, 2004), but we should charitably note that anthropocentric bias can 
come in at least three distinct forms: methodological, evaluative, and semantic.  Methodological anthropocentrism is 
a bias in the selection of experimental tasks on which to evaluate animals’ psychological skills; it occurs when we 
tend to test animals on tasks at which humans excel or that are taken directly from human psychology, without 
consideration of the animal’s own distinctive abilities or ecological niche.  Evaluative anthropocentrism occurs 
when we tend to hold that animals are “intelligent”, “interesting”, or otherwise valuable only if they behave just like 
us.  It is clear from context that it is methodological and evaluative anthropocentrism that Povinelli (2004) 
condemns.   
Semantic anthropocentrism, however, is the form that I will focus on below, and involves precisifying 
vaguely-defined psychological terms to human-level ability.  It is thus a form of semantic bias, similar to the 
tendency to demand a smaller number of hairs for baldness if we have just been primed by “Patrick Stewart” than if 
we had just been primed with “Cher”.  To add this idea to Penn and Povinelli’s notation, let us denote a category 
precisified to require human-level ability with a “+” sign, and thus a state exhibiting human-level reliability in 
tracking a mental state of another agent by “ms+”.  It is this third, semantic form of anthropocentrism that Povinelli 
and other skeptics routinely and repeatedly commit. 
Since Povinelli has denied that his arguments depend upon a controversially anthropocentric interpretation 
of ‘ToM’ (Povinelli & Vonk 2004), it will take some care to explain this charge.  In their rebuttal to an earlier 
criticism, Tomasello et al. (2003) claim that Povinelli and his colleagues commit an anthropocentric error by 
adopting a “black and white” picture of ToM rather than the graded notion they prefer.  Povinelli & Vonk (2004, 17-
18) respond that their research program has always endorsed a graded notion of ToM, in the sense that different 
species might be able to represent different mental states at different levels of development, and that their ability to 
do so might be composed of a variety of different skills or components.  This response, however, conflates two 
notions of gradation, and thus two distinct kinds of semantic bias.  The first notion of gradation holds that the ToM 
system might be decomposed into parts responsible for representing distinct mental states, parts that might emerge at 
different points in evolution and development; and the ability to robustly represent any mental state could be 
counted sufficient for ToM.   Povinelli and his colleagues are rightly declared innocent of committing this form of 
semantic anthropocentrism, for they are clear that they would be willing to accept a robust ability to represent 
perceptual states alone as evidence for ToM.  The second understanding of gradation, however, pertains to the 
varying degrees of reliability (e.g. number of different cues and their perceptual disparity) and varying numbers of 
contexts (e.g. cooperative vs. competitive) across which an ms candidate must covary with a target mental state to 
count as ToM.  Povinelli and colleagues do regularly commit this latter form of semantic anthropocentrism, for 
while conceding that both humans and animals only approximate the necessary representational power to different 
degrees (Penn et al. 2008, 161), the degree of abstraction and domain generality they require for ‘genuine ToM’ has 
always been none-too-subtly set to the highest levels of human performance. 
Indeed, a curious feature of Povinelli’s position is his repeated concession that even humans rarely engage 
in the abstract, domain-general, relational form of mental state representation that he supposes essential for ToM.  In 
most social interactions, such abilities would be redundant with information that can be obtained more directly from 
our embodied and enactive perceptual engagement with others.  While insisting that the relevant ability to abstractly 
represent mental states is “manifestly obvious in human behavior”, he has recently conceded that not even humans 
rely upon the relevant ability “most of the time in regard to our everyday interactions with others” (Gallagher & 
Povinelli, 2012, 151), that we routinely overestimate the degree to which we engage in such mental state 
representation (Penn & Povinelli, forthcoming), and even that adult humans approach social situations “in more 
chimp-like ways than young children” (Povinelli, 2011, 292).  Nevertheless, Povinelli has continued to invoke this 
extraordinary degree of reliability as criterial of ToM, while admitting that ToM so precisified will not explain the 
forms of everyday human social cognition that we probably share with animals.   
 In other words, Povinelli has compounded his semantic anthropocentrism by tying it to an inflated account 
of human cognitive abilities.  Such inflation is tempting, for our tendency to exaggerate our own intelligence, 
rationality, and reflective prowess is a feature of human psychology as well-established as our tendency to 
anthropomorphize.  Psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that we ascribe carefully reasoned justifications for 
actions that were performed due to whims, heuristics, or situational factors; we confabulate memories of forgotten 
details and even of events that never happened; and we are routinely overconfident in our own abilities and 
disregard or misinterpret evidence to the contrary (Ariely, 2009, 2012; Bermúdez, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002; Nisbett & Ross, 1980, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  While this 
literature has sometimes been over-interpreted, Malle, Knobe, and Nelson (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007; and see 
also Malle 2011) found in a careful meta-analysis of dozens of studies that people are more likely to explain their 
own behavior in terms of representational states like beliefs and desires and the behavior of others in terms of 
causal-historical factors such as cultural background, personality, and contextual cues.  In short, insofar as the 
skeptical challenge sets up animals as the “others” to be evaluated against “our” human-level performance, it may be 
exploiting our tendency to overestimate our own cognitive sophistication while construing others as automata whose 
behaviors are determined by situational influences, making inflated approaches to vague psychological terms seem 
more plausible than they otherwise would.    
Indeed, this attitude can be found lurking behind skeptical arguments against the possession by animals of 
other cognitive capacities.  Skeptics of animal metacognition have endorsed a similarly complex notion of “strong” 
metacognition that could not be implemented by first-order mechanisms sensitive only to evidence like the relative 
strengths of beliefs (Carruthers, 2008), while conceding that most evidence for human metacognition can also be 
explained by such mechanisms and that people will tend to overinterpret their own performance (Carruthers, 2009, 
130).  Against animal episodic memory, skeptics have claimed that our purported ability to mentally replay 
conscious experiences of past events is an essential feature of episodic memory (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008; 
Tulving, 1985), when human remembering is largely constructive and frequently confabulatory (Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Hippel & Trivers, 2011; Schacter, 1999). In each case, the skeptical position rests on a tenuous semantic 
premise that we must learn how to responsibly evaluate to determine whether the critique of a comparative claim is 
sound.
5
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 Note that we should distinguish skepticism about whether a given experiment is powerful enough to assess some 
criterion from skepticism about whether animals possess the psychological ability the criterion was elected to assess.  
For example, Carruthers may be right that existing animal metacognition experiments can be explained in terms of 
first-order mechanisms, but wrong that this prevents these experiments from providing evidence that animals 
possess “genuine” metacognition (because this assumption rests on an inflated criterion for metacognition). 
These semantic claims are all in danger of committing an error that I call ‘anthropofabulation’.  
Anthropofabulation arises from the combination of two biases:  semantic anthropocentrism and exaggeration about 
typical human cognitive ability.
6
  Together, they can lead one to implicitly add a “++” to some psychological term, 
claiming it obvious that only “++”-level ability is worthy of the name.7  Given that some of these terms originated in 
human psychology, one might mount a principled defense of “single-+” semantic anthropocentrism about them—but 
such defenses are more problematic when combined with an exaggerated account of typical human performance.   
To be clear, the error does not arise result merely from drawing such distinctions—exceptional human performance, 
like exceptional performance in any animal, is interesting and should be studied—but rather in assuming that only 
the incremented levels of ability reflect a “genuine” form of the capacity in question, the only form relevant to 
comparative psychology, and especially the form that other researchers have asserted that animals possess. 
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 Though I will not explore the implications here, semantic anthropocentrism and confabulation about human 
performance could also be combined with anthropomorphism.  This triumvirate of biases would result in the worst 
outcome yet: a comparative methodology which both presumed an inflated account of some psychological capacity 
and attributed that inflated capacity to animals on the basis of insufficient evidence.  While I suspect this kind of 
triple error is the mistake that Penn & Povinelli take their critical targets to have committed, this case falls apart if 
proponents do not share in their semantic anthropocentrism.  
7
 The sense in which anthropofabulation is implicit or automatic requires some elaboration.  Often, both errors that 
comprise anthropofabulation will be tacit—anthropofabulists will implicitly confabulate about the complexity of 
their own performance and implicitly presume that only similarly complex performance is worthy of the name.  
Penn & Povinelli, however, repeatedly complain that our understanding of ToM has relied too much on what they 
call “our species' inveterate intuitions about how our own ToM works” (2007, 732), so they cannot be accused of 
committing the former error unawares.  However, there is little evidence that they have critically evaluated the latter 
semantic assumption that “genuine” ToM requires the kind of domain-general competence presumed by this inflated 
folk psychology.   
 Figure 2.  A taxonomy showing the descent of anthropofabulation, the tendency to set the criteria for psychological 
capacities to an artificially-inflated sense of what humans can or routinely do. 
 
Given these concessions, together with the assumption that ‘ToM’ is vague and in need of clarification, it is 
difficult to see why the term must be explicated to exceptional, domain-general human performance.  Against this 
inflation, it is clearly not the sense of ‘ToM’ intended by animal ToM proponents.  Moreover, even if Penn et al. 
(2008) are right that this extraordinary level of ability enables many uniquely human achievements, such as our 
abilities to learn language, pass on a complex cultural heritage, and engage in political intrigue, it does not follow 
that this is the only empirically interesting place to draw the line.  There are other coherent interpretations of ‘ToM’ 
that would emphasize different comparisons between human and animal performance and more charitably interpret 
proponents’ claims (Buckner forthcoming), and which similarities or differences are theoretically important depends 
upon our explanatory purposes.  While the skeptics’ precisifications might better articulate the anthropological 
borderline, other scientists come at the issue with different interests.  For example, we might want to study animal 
social cognition to get a clearer picture of the wide range of tacit abilities that do the lion’s share of work in human 
social interactions; to map out the ecological pressures (such as large dominance hierarchies or domestication) that 
favor increased levels of social understanding; or to discover model organisms in order to understand and treat 
human pathologies.  These interests—notably, the ones more commonly invoked by animal ToM proponents—are at 
least as legitimate as the goal of learning what makes humans unique, and each would speak in favor of less 
restrictive precisifications of ‘ToM’. 
To avoid privileging one of these theoretical interests at the expense of others without adequate 
justification, such semantic questions should not be addressed by appealing to intuitions about what is a “genuine” 
or “strong” form of a capacity, but rather by assessing considerations of comparative cognitive taxonomy.  
Typically, however, no systematic analysis of considerations like scope and power is offered by skeptics in defense 
of their explications of key terms; instead, they quickly move on from the assertion that their interpretation of the 
term is the only faithful, valuable, or scientifically-rigorous choice. In the skeptics’ defense, proponents are rarely 
explicit about their own semantic assumptions, making a comparison of competing interpretations difficult; 
however, while proponents can often be fairly accused of vagueness, this does not license skeptics to uncharitably 
place their own strong interpretations on proponents’ claims when other options are available.   
Broadly, different interpretations should be evaluated in terms of the trade-off between the scope and 
power of the competing taxonomic schemes they support—scope indicating the number of cases to which a 
precisified term applies (i.e. “how many things does it tell us about?”), and power indicating the number and 
explanatory power of the generalizations derived from the term’s application to those cases (i.e. “how much does it 
tell us about them?”).8 Should an explication cleanly separate human and animal performance, this indeed increases 
the term’s explanatory power; but should those generalizations apply only in rare cases even for humans, this 
increase in power is purchased only at the high price of greatly diminished scope.  In cases where there are sensible 
alternative interpretations with more attractive scope/power tradeoffs, such exclusionary explications are at a clear 
disadvantage. Worse, such explications ex hypothesi tell us little about how animals (and humans, most of the time) 
actually do approach tasks, and so risk taking terms with productive research programs behind them out of the 
comparative discussion without replacing them by anything more precise. 
Skeptics may protest at this point, contending that the worry that the experiments of proponents are not 
powerful enough in principle to distinguish genuine from “as-if” forms of an ability are precisely indictments of the 
explanatory power of the proponents’ psychological taxonomies.  Crucially, however, skeptics must first be granted 
their interpretations of psychological terms for these methodological critiques to succeed, so such interpretations of 
experiments cannot count as independent evidence in favor of their inflationary explications of key terms.  For 
example, if the more limited degrees of reliability and numbers of contexts across which chimpanzees have 
demonstrated an ability to respond to the mental states of others are adequate to count as evidence for ToM on 
ecumenical construals such as Whiten’s “intervening variable” approach (1996)—as proponents have repeatedly 
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 For a related discussion of comparisons between taxonomies, see Griffiths (1999, 216-219); and for an in depth 
discussion of explanatory power, see Ylikoski & Kuorikoski (2010). 
contended (Tomasello & Call 2006)
9—then these experiments instead enhance the scope and power of proponents’ 
alternative taxonomic schemes.  Moreover, anthropofabulous taxonomies certainly have more scope/power 
disadvantages than skeptics admit—for their anthropofabulous interpretation of ‘ToM’ has forced skeptics to 
shoehorn varied animal performance into poorly-defined categories such as “behavior-reading” that might be used 
post-hoc to explain nearly any experimental outcome (Fletcher & Carruthers 2012).  In short, the central argument 
skeptics have offered against the explanatory power of proponent’s taxonomic schemes only succeeds if they have 
already been granted their interpretations of key terms, and so cannot be counted as independent evidence in favor of 
those interpretations.  Such arguments at best show that the skeptics’ interpretations of proponents’ experiments are 
consistent with their own skepticism.   
In summary, the problem with anthropofabulation is not that it always favors false verdicts; like 
anthropomorphic bias, anthropofabulous reasoning can sometimes happen upon the right answer.  The problem is 
that it biases us to accept inflationary answers to semantic questions on the basis of insufficient evidence.  
Unchecked, the bias can lead us to underestimate the psychological abilities of animals, further impoverish our 
taxonomies of the intermediate levels of cognition, and focus comparative discussion on rarified human abilities 
without adequate theoretical justification.   
  
                                                          
9
 Whiten’s “intervening variable” notion does require the integration of information across some range of 
perceptually disparate situations to justify the appeal to a hidden variable.  However, Call & Tomasello (2006) 
contend that existing experiments already demonstrate that chimpanzees respond appropriately to the mental states 
of others across a variety of perceptually disparate situations by integrating a complex combination of cues, 
including eye-directions, body orientations, whether the line of gaze does or does not terminate in a plausible target, 
presence or absence of occluders, and the type of occluders involved. 
  
 
Table 2.  Explanation of “+”modification of Penn & Povinelli (2007)’s quasi-formalism, in terms of degree of 
reliability required to demonstrate competence in representing mental states of others. 
 
III. Hume’s Dictum 
If our tendency to anthropofabulate is automatic and powerful, how might we guard against this form of 
semantic bias?  I suggest that just as Morgan’s Canon has served as a corrective against anthropomorphic bias, a 
similar rule of thumb can help us limit anthropofabulation.  Luckily, anthropofabulation (like many other sins) was 
not invented in the 20
th
 Century, and so we do not have to start from scratch.  In particular, Hume discerned the bias 
centuries ago in the doctrines of rationalists like Descartes (who attributed elaborate rational faculties to humans 
while infamously holding that animals are mere mechanical automata); and to guard against it, he recommended a 
corrective, which I will refer to as “Hume’s Dictum” (1739/2000): 
When any hypothesis . . . is advanc’d to explain a mental operation, which is common to men and beasts, 
we must apply the same hypothesis to both; and as every true hypothesis will abide this trial, so I may 
venture to affirm, that no false one will ever be able to endure it. The common defect of those systems, 
which philosophers have employ’d to account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a 
subtility and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals but even of children 
and the common people in our own species.”  (T1.3.16.3; SBN 177) 
Let us proceed to unpack the Dictum carefully. 
The first interpretive issue with the Dictum is that its application in the present context would appear to beg 
the question against skeptics.  Precisely what is disputed is whether capacities like ToM are common to humans and 
animals, so it is inappropriate to begin from the assumption that they are shared.  To apply the case to the present 
series of interpretive questions, we should here insert a “within bounds of rational possibility” before “common to 
men and beasts”.  In other words, suppose that the vague disputed terms have a consensus extension agreed upon by 
Notation Criteria 
ms Default vague level of reliability 
ms+ Typical human performance 
ms++ 
Highest ranges of  
human performance 
mere anthropocentrism 
anthropofabulation 
all parties, and then a disputed penumbra.  All precisifications of the term must satisfy what we might call a term’s 
“consensus stereotype”, or the set of descriptions associated with the term to which we would appeal to decide 
whether someone understood it.  For example, perhaps it is uncontroversial that ToM is the capacity that: 
1. Enables its possessor to predict and/or explain the behavior of others, 
2. Humans distinctively excel at, 
3. Is typically impaired in autistic individuals, and 
4.    Exhibits these other properties by representing another’s mental states. 
 
This consensus stereotype sets the bounds for rational debate (disagreements arise only later, when researchers 
attempt to precisify a vague stereotype).  If one recommends a precisification of a vague concept that grossly 
violates its consensus stereotype, it is like calling (a non-shorn) Cher ‘bald’; we must conclude either that the 
speaker means the word in a non-literal sense or does not understand its meaning.
10
  Thus, the Dictum is relevant to 
terms for which some precisifications within the bounds of its stereotype would plausibly apply to the abilities of 
both humans and animals. This interpretive point will be of little practical consequence, however, for as we shall see 
applying the Dictum even more liberally would not prevent us from favoring criteria that humans would typically 
satisfy but animals would fail.   
Secondly, the Dictum holds that when assessing whether some psychological capacity is shared between 
humans and animals, we should adopt competence criteria that can be fairly applied to both.  “Competence criteria” 
here indicates not merely operational criteria chosen to assess the presence of a capacity in some particular 
experiment, but rather the general abilities or dispositions (derived by precisifying a term’s stereotype) that a subject 
should by definition possess if it is endowed with the psychological capacity in question.   There is, of course, a 
close relationship between a capacity’s general competence criteria and the specific operational criteria selected to 
assess its presence in any particular experiment.  For example, the skeptics’ competence criteria for perceptual ToM 
might be “a domain-general ability to represent and respond appropriately to the perceptual states of others”, and an 
operational criterion derived from it for a cooperative food-begging experiment might be “begs for food from the 
collaborator that can see.”  Moreover, a competence criterion will typically only be exposed as problematic when it 
in practice limits experimentalists to operational criteria that only exceptional human performance can satisfy.  
                                                          
10
 This is not to say that consensus stereotypes cannot change over time.  For example, if we learned that the 
association between autism and ToM-deficits were a statistical artifact, or that ‘autism’ conflates distinct disorders 
with different etiologies, we might revise our stereotype to modify or exclude property 3. 
Nevertheless, as understood here the pure form of anthropofabulation arises at the definitional stage, by precisifying 
a term’s meaning by appealing to inflationary competence criteria, rather than by deriving an inflationary 
operational criterion from an adequate definition.
11
 
The stipulation that we adopt only competence criteria that fairly apply to both humans and animals is also 
non-controversial, but carries some subtle consequences.  For example, this proscription implies that we should do 
our best to avoid criteria that could not be deployed on animals, such as verbal descriptions and probes, preferring 
those that can, such as non-verbal forms of response assessment (e.g. comparisons of looking-times).
12
  It also 
requires that we do our best to provide animals with learning histories and cultural scaffolding comparable to those 
enjoyed by the human subjects purported to satisfy the criteria.  At the very least, it demands that we skeptically 
regard human subjects’ verbal reports as behavioral data that may be misleading, rather than as necessarily reliable 
reports of subjects’ cognitive activity. Anthropofabulation renders such challenges more difficult to overcome, for it 
directs our attention towards increasingly complex, artificial, and anthropocentric tasks as the only ones powerful 
enough to distinguish “genuine” from “as-if” forms of ability.   
 To consider some examples, Boesch (2007) comprehensively reviews the comparative literature on ToM, 
pointing out how nearly every experiment violates these ideals of fairness by pitting captive chimpanzees against 
free-ranging humans, humans working with conspecifics against chimpanzees working with heterospecifics, humans 
with parents nearby against apes without parents nearby, or humans on familiar materials against apes on unfamiliar 
materials.  Anthropofabulation unduly minimizes the importance of these disanalogies, for the presumption that 
humans routinely deploy the idealized, domain-general forms of ToM can lead us to assume that the success of the 
human subjects in these experiments does not depend upon this additional developmental and environmental 
scaffolding.  To consider another example, episodic memory researchers have, following Tulving (1985), long relied 
on asking subjects whether they really “remember” or merely “know” some fact to decide whether the autonoietic 
consciousness of previously experienced events supposed essential for episodic memory has been activated in an 
experiment.  While there is no doubt some mechanism producing subjects’ responses to this probe, we should regard 
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 While the former, definitional form of anthropofabulation is more methodologically troublesome (because it 
semantically institutionalizes bias), the latter is also a serious and closely-related form of error that can similarly be 
avoided by attending to Hume’s Dictum.   
12
 Unless, of course, verbal acuity is an essential component of the capacity being assessed. 
with skepticism the tacit assumption that their reports necessarily derive from a conscious replay of past experience.  
Indeed, it has been shown repeatedly that confabulators report the subjective sense of remembering events that never 
happened (Schnider, 2008), and people generally overestimate the reliability of human memory, creating notorious 
problems with eyewitness testimony in court cases (Simons & Chabris, 2011).   
For both capacities, emphasis on anthropofabulous criteria have resulted in biased comparisons, whereas 
fairer comparisons would more clearly expose the limited scope of such inflationary criteria in even human 
psychology. In short, the Dictum’s second component can be read as an “equal skepticism” clause; whatever level of 
skepticism we apply in selecting and applying the competence criteria for evidence of animal abilities, so should we 
deploy in the case of humans—while noting that we are especially prone to exaggerate our own prowess and 
underplay the importance of our own background, situation, and culture.   
The final component of the Dictum is the demand that we set competence criteria for vaguely-defined 
capacities not to the highest ranks of human performance, but rather only to the typical performance of children and 
the folk.  The Dictum acquires some significant bite in current debates with this restriction, for by requiring that 
competence criteria be satisfiable by children and typical adult performance, it makes it more difficult to add a “++” 
(or above) to every psychological capacity.   
The stickiest question in applying the Dictum, however, regards this mention of children.  For example, 
ToM in humans is composed of a variety of skills and levels of ability that emerge at different developmental stages.  
Should we set the age limit for children to six months of age, we have virtually guaranteed that ToM will be 
common to both humans and animals, since six-month-olds are unlikely to have developed much reliability in 
representing any sorts of mental states.  Similarly, if we set the bar to twenty years of age, we will guarantee that 
ToM will be uniquely human, as average humans at this point will have achieved a level of reliability that no animal 
could ever reach.  The same goes for the other capacities; for example, stability in the “remembers” vs. “knows” 
probe often used in episodic memory research does not emerge until late adolescence (Piolino et al., 2007).  
Importantly, such age ranges are likely variable even for humans; Boesch (2007, 231) argues that the age at which 
explicit false-belief understanding (often regarded as a criterial milestone in the ontogeny of human ToM) emerges 
in humans varies widely and is heavily influenced by developmental and cultural factors. Likely there can be no 
general answer to the “how old” question here; age-ranges must rather be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
depending upon the capacity and comparative claims in question.  As a heuristic, we might limit our attention to age 
ranges before which humans of the relevant comparison culture could be expected to have enjoyed a relevant 
learning history and cultural context difficult or impossible to reproduce in animal subjects.  This heuristic is 
justified by the idea that the later we look in human development, the more likely it becomes that superior 
performance is due to a more extensive learning history and/or cultural scaffolding rather than to some uniquely 
human cognitive mechanism (Barrett, 2008; McGonigle & Chalmers, 2008).  While modest, this heuristic provides 
useful guidance in evaluating comparative claims.  For example, while Povinelli & Eddy (1996) famously reported 
that their chimpanzees failed a range of ToM tasks, chimpanzees tested by Bulloch et al. (2008) are reported as 
having passed some of the same tasks—the latter speculating that their chimps were more successful due to more 
extensive (and thus more human-like) experience with human collaborators.  
I believe that skeptics would generally endorse these components of Hume’s Dictum, albeit while 
attempting to push their limits.  As noted above, setting the bar at ms+ is indeed semantic anthropocentrism; but 
whether “single-+”anthropocentrism is an error is at least partly an empirical question.  However, the Dictum does 
make it much more difficult to interpret vague psychological terms in an anthropofabulous (‘++’) way by requiring 
that precisifications possess at least a modicum of scope, covering at least typical, fairly-assessed human 
performance.   
Skeptics may worry at this point that Hume’s Dictum has become too strong, in that would prevent us in 
principle from discussing exceptional human abilities in a comparative context.  It bears emphasizing that Hume’s 
Dictum as interpreted here does no such thing, for it applies only to vague terms whose consensus stereotype covers 
at least some animal performance.  It does not prevent us from coining new terms or developing conventions for 
modifying old ones to clarify features supposedly manifest only in exceptional human performance.  Moreover, if 
anthropofabulation commonly derives from overestimation of the degree of reliability and domain-generality of 
human representational prowess, then one can explicitly characterize the differences between typical and 
exceptional human ability as differences of degree in some more vaguely-characterized type of capacity—as I have 
done with the “++” modification of Povinelli’s ‘ms’-formalism above.  Introducing such compositional modifiers 
allows the accommodation of a more coarse-grained comparative taxonomy to the finer-grained differences in 
human and animal performance, in the way that the periodic table of elements can be accommodated to diversity in 
the nuclear configurations of different chemical compounds, ions, and isotopes without having to decide which 
forms of a substance are “genuine” and which merely “as-if”.13   
A final question about Hume’s Dictum is whether, and in what ways, it can be combined with Morgan’s 
Canon.  It might initially seem that the two principles are in direct conflict; for Morgan’s Canon, at least on a strong 
reading, recommends the conclusion that animals lack “higher” processes if experiments fail to establish them, 
whereas Hume’s Dictum should lead us to worry that experiments only failed to establish higher processes because 
those experiments had been designed to assess inflated criteria.  However, on a more moderate reading of the Canon 
(cf. footnote 1), the two principles are actually complementary, for each is designed to counter a distinct bias that 
arises at a distinct phase of comparative research.
14
 Anthropofabulation biases our interpretation of vague 
psychological terms, leading us to design experiments to assess artificially-inflated competence criteria; 
anthropomorphism biases our interpretation of experimental results, leading us to accept that some data satisfy some 
competence criteria on the basis of insufficient evidence.  Moving beyond oversimplified “pro-” or “anti-”animal 
thinking, a healthy comparative project must avoid both biases—by electing fair criteria for experiments to assess, 
and then relying on objective, empirical assessment of whether those criteria have been satisfied.       
IV.  Conclusion 
In a Darwinian framework, there is no good reason to avoid concepts merely because they derive from the 
behaviors of the species to which we belong.  Application of these concepts to animals not only enriches the 
range of hypotheses to be considered, but it also changes the view of ourselves: the more human-like we 
permit animals to become, the more animal-like we become in the process. (De Waal, 2000, 272, quoted in 
Keeley, 2004) 
                                                          
13
 For a brief discussion on how compositional operators can support the accommodation of abstract taxonomies to 
underlying diversity, see Boyd (1999, 157-158).  Note that differences in degree captured by such modifiers may or 
may not indicate qualitative differences; for example, the two architecturally distinct systems for human ToM 
postulated by Apperly & Butterfill (2009) might be mapped to ms+ and ms++, respectively. 
14
 Indeed, a reviewer points out that Morgan himself would likely have been sympathetic to Hume’s position here.  
Morgan was well-aware that humans often overestimate their own prowess and that this can interfere with cross-
species comparisons—warning that “to interpret animal behavior one must learn also to see one's own mentality at 
levels of development much lower than one's top-level of reflective self-consciousness. It is not easy, and savors 
somewhat of paradox" (Morgan 1930, 250).   
Adhering to Hume’s Dictum improves not only our understanding of animal minds, but of human minds as 
well.   Povinelli implores us to avoid methodological and evaluative anthropocentrism so that we may study 
chimpanzee psychology for its own sake, without seeing them as “smaller, duller, less talkative versions” (2004, 29) 
of humans.  Similarly eschewing anthropofabulation, however, can help us take a long, hard look in the mirror and 
realize that we are also typically smaller, duller, and less talkative than we tend to suppose.  This is not to denigrate 
the import or interestingness of the resultant human or comparative psychology; on the contrary, it is notable that it 
took researchers only months after the first digital computer was built to create programs that could manipulate 
higher-order relations on predigested formal problems well beyond the ability of any human, whereas we still 
struggle to build machines that can solve problems of social coordination or learn novel causal relationships as 
reliably and flexibly as humans and animals in real-time perceptual circumstances.  While the former are indeed 
distinctively human cognitive achievements, they play a much smaller role in our everyday lives than the other 
capacities—the tacit, subpersonal, interactive, and heuristic—that still await precise characterization and machine 
reproduction.   Much of the challenge and wonder in studying nonhuman animals is that doing so can help us 
develop a conceptual taxonomy adequate to describe the vast underground foundation of shared abilities supporting 
the “heights” of human achievement.  In short, avoiding anthropofabulation not only helps us better understand the 
minds of animals; it can also better acquaint us with our own. 
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